Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing Face of Restructuring in Canada: Quantitative Outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA Proceedings by Nocilla, Alfonso
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 42 
Issue 2 42:2 (2019) Special Issue: Business 
Law 
Article 6 
12-1-2019 
Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing Face of Restructuring in 
Canada: Quantitative Outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA 
Proceedings 
Alfonso Nocilla 
University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Common 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alfonso Nocilla, "Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing Face of Restructuring in Canada: Quantitative 
Outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA Proceedings" (2019) 42:2 Dal LJ 372. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
D
A
L
H
O
U
S
IE
 L
A
W
 J
O
U
R
N
A
L
94
DALHOUSIE 
LAW 
JOURNAL
DALHOUSIE 
LA  
JOURNAL
Volume 42 Number 2 Fall 2019
Business Law
A Survey and Critique of the “Seller in Posession”
Statutory Regimes of Common Law Canada:  An
ABC Prequel
 Clayton Bangsund
Disrupting Business as Usual:  Considering Teaching
Methods in Business Law Classrooms
 Jeffery Hewitt and Shanthi E. Senthe
Manufacturing Consent to Climate Inaction:  A Case Study
of The Globe and Mail ’s Pipeline Coverage
 Jason MacLean
Third-Party Liability of Directors and Of cers:  Reconciling
Corporate Personality and Personal Responsibility in Tort
 Michael Marin
Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing Face of
Restructuring in Canada:  Quantitative Outcomes of
2012 and 2013 CCAA Proceedings
 Alfonso Nocilla
Evaluating Canadian Tax Remission Orders:  A Debt
Relief Vehicle for Taxpayers
 Samuel Singer
Corporate Risk and Climate Impacts to Critical Energy
Infrastructure in Canada
 Rudiger Tscherning
Acceptance Speech for Lifetime Achievement Award 
from Canadian Prison Lawyers Association
 Michael Jackson, QC
Judicial Treatment of Aboriginal Peoples’ Oral History
Evidence:  More Room for Reconciliation
[Winner of 2019 Tory Legal Writing Prize]
 Jimmy Peterson
Alfonso Nocilla*  Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing
Face of Restructuring in Canada:
Quantitative Outcomes of 2012 and 2013
CCAA Proceedings
This article examines quantitative data on the outcomes of proceedings under 
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), Canada’s principal statute 
for resolving large, complex corporate insolvencies. In particular, this article 
compares the durations, direct costs, and returns to different classes of creditors 
generated by traditional reorganizations under the CCAA and by “liquidating 
CCAAs”—that is, proceedings in which the insolvent debtor sells substantially 
all of its assets rather than reorganizing itself. The article makes a number of 
contributions to the existing scholarship. Firstly, quantitative data on CCAA 
proceedings are rare.  The data examined here, collected by the author from 
proceedings initiated in 2012 and 2013, provide novel insights into the functioning 
of the CCAA. Secondly, the article questions much of the conventional wisdom 
surrounding liquidating CCAAs based upon the data, suggesting that further 
study is required.  Thirdly, the article proposes reforms to address the problems 
raised by liquidating CCAAs.
Le présent article examine des données quantitatives sur l’issue des procédures 
intentées en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des 
compagnies (LACC), la principale loi canadienne visant à régler les dossiers 
complexes et importants d’insolvabilité des entreprises. En particulier, l’article 
compare les durées, les coûts directs et le rendement pour différentes catégories 
de créanciers générés par les réorganisations traditionnelles en vertu de la LACC 
et par les « liquidations en vertu de la LACC »—c’est-à-dire les procédures 
dans lesquelles le débiteur insolvable vend la quasi-totalité de ses actifs plutôt 
que de se réorganiser. L’article fait un certain nombre de contributions au 
bagage de connaissances existant. Premièrement, les données quantitatives 
sur les procédures en vertu de la LACC sont rares. Les données examinées 
ici, recueillies par l’auteur dans le cadre de procédures entamées en 2012 et 
2013, fournissent de nouvelles perspectives sur le fonctionnement de la LACC. 
Deuxièmement, l’article remet en question une grande partie de la sagesse 
conventionnelle entourant les liquidations en vertu de la  LACC fondée sur les 
données, ce qui donne à penser qu’une étude plus approfondie est nécessaire. 
Troisièmement, l’article propose des réformes pour régler les problèmes soulevés 
par les liquidations. 
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Introduction
The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act1 is the principal legal 
mechanism for restructuring large, insolvent corporations in Canada.2 
Historically, CCAA restructurings involved lengthy negotiations among 
the creditors and other stakeholders of insolvent debtors, culminating in 
a formal restructuring plan on which the creditors would vote. In most 
1. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA].
2. The terms “company,” “corporation,” and “entity” are used interchangeably throughout this 
article. Pursuant to section 3(1) of the Act, any “debtor company” or af? liated debtor companies 
having at least $5 million in debt can apply for CCAA protection. Although the de? nition of “debtor 
company” in section 2(1) does not expressly include entities such as partnerships, the courts have 
used their inherent jurisdiction to extend protection to partnerships that are part of corporate groups 
in CCAA proceedings. See e.g. Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd, [1993] OJ No 14, 9 BLR (2d) 275 
(ONSC); Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, [2009] OJ No 4286, 2009 CanLII 55114 (ONSC) 
[Re Canwest]; Re Calpine Energy Canada Ltd 2006 ABQB 153.
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cases, the aim was to restore the debtor to pro? tability and continue 
operating. More recently, the emphasis of most CCAA proceedings has 
shifted away from the objective of reorganizing the debtor as such toward 
the sale of the debtor’s assets, whether piecemeal or on a going concern 
basis. These “liquidating CCAAs” are typically planned before the debtor 
company has applied for CCAA protection. Once CCAA protection is 
granted, an abridged process is carried out in which the debtor’s assets are 
marketed and sold. Often, there is either no formal plan of arrangement 
or the plan simply provides for the distribution of the sale proceeds to the 
debtor’s creditors. In this way, the CCAA is said to have evolved into a 
more ? exible mechanism that permits both traditional reorganizations and 
sales of substantially all the assets of insolvent debtor companies.3
Somewhere amidst this evolution in CCAA law, important questions 
have been left unanswered. Proponents of liquidating CCAAs maintain that 
sales generate better returns for creditors compared with reorganizations 
while still preserving the debtor’s underlying business in many cases, 
thereby saving jobs and avoiding many of the negative consequences of 
a liquidation in bankruptcy.4 Central to this view of liquidating CCAAs is 
the implication that any harm to junior creditors that might result from 
the abridged process is minimal and, in any event, is outweighed by the 
supposed bene? ts of the quick sale. Thus far, however, there has been 
no empirical evidence presented to support such assertions. The reality 
is that, despite years of debate over the propriety of liquidating CCAAs, 
there remains a paucity of data on the outcomes of CCAA proceedings. 
Liquidating CCAAs and their most recent derivative, pre-packaged sales 
or “pre-packs,” continue to proliferate even though empirical evidence of 
their supposed bene? ts is noticeably absent from the jurisprudence and 
the scholarship.5
This article examines the quantitative outcomes of CCAA proceedings 
commenced between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2013. Speci? cally, 
this article compares data on the duration, costs, and outcomes of CCAA 
sales and full reorganizations. Necessarily, the decision to pursue any given 
restructuring option consigns “all other possible outcomes…to the realm 
3. Re 8640025 Canada Inc, 2018 BCCA 93 at para 45 [8640025 Canada].
4. Anthony Duggan et al, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Cases, Text and Materials, 
3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2015) at 614.
5. See Tushara Weerasooriya et al, “Pre-Packs under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act: 
Has the Push for Ef? ciency Undermined Fairness?” in Janis P Sarra & Honourable Barbara Romaine, 
eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 347: “further 
empirical analysis is required in order to validate and better understand the bene? ts of pre-packaged 
transactions” (ibid at 349) (by way of background, in a pre-pack, the debtor negotiates the terms of the 
sale prior to ? ling for CCAA protection).
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of the hypothetical.”6 Accordingly, the key data points examined in this 
article serve as proxies for evaluating the relative success of liquidating 
CCAAs compared with full reorganization proceedings.
Part I below provides an overview of the CCAA regime and discusses 
the emergence of liquidating CCAAs and their implications. Part II 
describes the methodology of the quantitative study undertaken here and 
the results, asking whether the data support assertions that liquidating 
CCAAs are indeed faster, cheaper and more likely to maximize value for 
creditors than full reorganizations. Part III considers the implications of 
the quantitative results presented here and proposes reforms of the CCAA 
regime.
I. Overview of Canadian restructuring law
The CCAA is the primary mechanism for resolving large, complex 
corporate insolvencies in Canada. Alternatively, insolvent corporations 
may ? le a commercial proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act.7 While the BIA commercial proposal process is popular with small 
and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs), it is rarely used by large corporations 
or corporate groups. Accordingly, there are typically many more BIA 
proposals than CCAA proceedings annually, but the average size of the 
debtor corporations is much higher in CCAA proceedings. For example, 
the Of? ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada (OSB) reported 
that there were 32 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2013, compared with 
754 commercial proposal proceedings; however, the average total value 
of assets in BIA proposals was $875,649, compared with $105,234,468 in 
CCAA proceedings.8
There are several reasons why the CCAA is the preferred tool for large, 
complex restructurings. Firstly, the BIA prescribes various strict deadlines 
that a debtor must meet in order to remain under court protection.9 In 
6. Richard B Jones, “The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law” in 
Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005 (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) 481 at 519.
7. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, Part III, Division I [BIA].
8. See Roderick J Wood, “Receiverships in Canada: Myth and Reality” (2017) 80:1 Sask L Rev 231 
at 243-245, citing Canada, Of? ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, CCAA Statistics in Canada: 
Fourth Quarter of 2015 (Ottawa: Industry Canada), online: <publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.507922/
publication.html> [perma.cc/F45N-WH3C]. In fact, the average value for CCAA companies in 2013 
was low—the average value was $156,559,320 in 2014 and $579,444,450 in 2015. This ? uctuation 
may be explained, in part, by the relatively small number of cases in each year, such that a few very 
large insolvencies skew the average. Nonetheless, these average values show that the CCAA tends to 
be used by only the largest companies.
9. See e.g. BIA, supra note 7 s 50.4(2)(b), which requires the debtor to ? le a cash ? ow statement 
within 10 days of ? ling its notice of intention to ? le a proposal, and s 50.4(8), which provides that 
the debtor must ? le its proposal within 30 days from the notice date, failing which the debtor will be 
assigned to bankruptcy automatically.
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contrast, the CCAA has no hard deadlines, and the CCAA process can be 
extended by court order for as long as may be necessary to facilitate the 
restructuring. Secondly, if the creditors vote against a commercial proposal 
under the BIA, the debtor is automatically assigned into bankruptcy.10 
Under the CCAA, meanwhile, a debtor whose creditors have rejected its 
restructuring plan may remain under court protection, and may continue 
negotiating with its creditors with a view to revising its plan. Thirdly, the 
broad discretion granted to CCAA judges also makes the CCAA a more 
? exible restructuring tool than the BIA. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
explained in Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General),11 the 
CCAA is a relatively short statute which empowers supervising judges 
to grant orders approving restructuring steps that may not be speci? cally 
authorized in the explicit language of the Act:12
CCAA decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. 
The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts 
under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as “the hothouse of 
real-time litigation” has been the primary method by which the CCAA 
has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and 
social needs.13
The broad discretion granted to CCAA judges corresponds with the 
broad remedial purposes of the Act, namely, to permit insolvent debtors 
“to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and 
economic costs of liquidating [their] assets.”14 In pursuing these objectives, 
courts must give “an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation” to 
the Act’s provisions.15 The “broad reading of CCAA authority developed by 
the jurisprudence” has been recognized by Parliament in section 11 of the 
Act, which empowers the CCAA court to “make any order that it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances.”16 The structure of the CCAA—which 
“is geared towards the development of a plan of arrangement that will be 
presented before the creditors” for a vote—re? ects the Act’s purpose of 
10. Ibid s 61(2)(b).
11. Century Services Inc v Canada (AG), 2010 SCC 60 [Century Services].
12. Ibid at para 58.
13. Jones, supra note 6 at 484.
14. Century Services, supra note 11 at para 16.
15. Ibid at para 65.
16. Ibid at para 68.
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facilitating traditional reorganizations, in which creditors negotiate among 
themselves over the fate of the insolvent debtor company.17
More recently, the CCAA jurisprudence has shifted to recognize that, 
in addition to a traditional reorganization, it is also possible to preserve 
the value of an insolvent enterprise through a going concern sale of 
the underlying business. However, given the CCAA’s structure as a 
reorganization statute, the emergence of liquidating CCAAs has given rise 
to several unresolved issues. In particular, as a general matter, sales can 
also be carried out through court-appointed receivership proceedings and 
bankruptcy proceedings under the BIA. Accordingly, it is important to ask 
why many debtors seek to sell their assets through more expensive CCAA 
proceedings than through the more obvious and cost-effective alternatives. 
The shift toward sales and away from reorganizations is one of the 
more remarkable judicially-driven “evolutions” of the CCAA because 
reorganization and liquidation are fundamentally different processes.18
At the same time, the use of other mechanisms to restructure or liquidate 
the assets of debtor companies, such as court-appointed receivers, has all 
but disappeared for large companies. Several reasons may explain this 
shift away from receiverships, including, for example, the ? exibility of the 
CCAA and the broad powers of the CCAA judge compared with receivers. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, successor employer liability is less 
of a concern for the debtor company carrying out a liquidating CCAA, 
whereas a similar sale through a receivership could attract successor 
employer liability for the receiver under provincial labour and employment 
laws. As such, since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2006 decision in TCT 
Logistics,19 which held that receivers could be found liable as successor 
employers, receiverships have seen a marked decline while CCAA sales 
have been on the rise.20
17. Roderick J Wood, “Rescue and Liquidation in Restructuring Law” (2013) 53:3 Can Bus LJ 407 
at 410-411. Central to the CCAA’s reorganization purpose was the view, prevalent at the time of its 
enactment, that reorganization would preserve going concern value by avoiding the loss of goodwill 
and other intangible assets: see Century Services, supra note 11 at para 18.
18. For a further comparison of reorganization and liquidation under the CCAA, see Duggan, supra 
note 4 at 612-613; and Alfonso Nocilla, “Is ‘Corporate Rescue’ Working in Canada?” (2013) 53:3 Can 
Bus LJ 382; but see 8640025 Canada, supra note 3; see also Arrangement relatif à Bloom Lake, 2017 
QCCS 4057: “[t]he Court notes that there is nothing in any way pejorative about qualifying the CCAA 
as a liquidating CCAA. That is a legitimate and increasingly frequent use of CCAA proceedings.” (ibid 
at para 174) [Bloom Lake].
19.  GMAC Commercial Credit Corp—Canada v TCT Logistics Inc, 2006 SCC 35.
20. See David Bish, “The Plight of Receiverships in a CCAA World” (2013) 2 J Insol Inst Can 221 
at 232, and Jeffrey C Carhart, “The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in TCT Logistics and the 
Future of Receiverships in Canada” (2007) 44:3 Can Bus LJ 376. It should be noted that the shift from 
receiverships to CCAA sales is primarily a large company phenomenon, as private and court-appointed 
receiverships remain popular tools for smaller companies, see Wood, supra note 8.
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The shift to using the CCAA predominately for sales rather than 
reorganizations presents a number of issues. Firstly, although amendments 
to the Act in 2009 codi? ed the court’s authority to approve CCAA sales 
under section 36, as I have argued elsewhere, section 36 is deeply 
? awed.21 In adding section 36 to the Act, Parliament seems not to have 
fully appreciated the implications of using the CCAA to sell the assets of 
insolvent companies wholesale, a process that was previously carried out 
in receivership and bankruptcy proceedings. Speci? cally, Parliament failed 
to provide substantive guidance to CCAA judges in determining whether 
to approve liquidating CCAAs or even to specify which test courts should 
use—although section 36(3) sets out various factors that courts should 
consider when asked to approve a sale, these factors overlap signi? cantly 
with the older test for receivership sales set out in Royal Bank v Soundair.22
The result is that courts have taken to applying both tests in many cases, 
apparently unsure of which one ought to govern, with some courts stating 
that section 36 is not determinative at all.23 In practice, the court will rely 
heavily upon the monitor’s opinion in deciding whether to grant the order 
authorizing the sale. The deference shown by courts to monitors in CCAA 
sales mirrors the deference shown to receivers:
If the court were to reject the recommendations of the Receiver in any 
but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish 
and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception 
of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion 
to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the 
Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made 
upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible 
of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-
appointed receivers.24
21. The amendments were introduced in Bill C-12, An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 
47 of the Statutes of Canada, 2005, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007 (assented to 14 December 2007) and 
subsequently became An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada, 
2005, SC 2007, c 36.
22. Royal Bank v Soundair, [1991] OJ No 1137, 4 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Soundair].
23. See Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915: “The elements which can be found in 
section 36 CCAA are, ? rst of all, not limitative and secondly need not be all ful? lled in order to grant 
or not grant an order under this section.” (ibid at para 48). For further discussion, see also Alfonso 
Nocilla, “Asset Sales Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of section 36” 
(2012) 52:2 Can Bus LJ 226; Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs—Are We Praying to False 
Gods?” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2008 (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) 33.
24. Calpine Canada Energy Limited (Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act), 2007 ABQB 49 at 
para 52, citing Crown Trust Co v Rosenberg (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 at 112, 39 DLR (4th) 526 (Ont HC).
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Secondly, whereas the BIA provides a detailed priority ranking 
scheme for distributing the proceeds from the sale of the bankrupt’s assets 
among its creditors, the CCAA contains no such distribution scheme.25
Accordingly, when a liquidating CCAA concludes, the debtor will 
either enter bankruptcy or receivership proceedings for the purposes of 
distributing the sale proceeds, or it will ? le a formal plan of arrangement 
under the CCAA for the sole purpose of proposing how to distribute the 
proceeds among its creditors. This state of affairs has led the Supreme 
Court of Canada to state, in Indalex, that even though a liquidating CCAA 
may achieve essentially the same result as a BIA liquidation—a sale of 
substantially all of the debtor’s assets—the distribution scheme used in 
liquidating CCAAs need not be the same as the scheme set out in the BIA.26
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interplay between the BIA 
and CCAA in these regards is perplexing. In short, it is not at all clear 
why functionally equivalent processes under the BIA and CCAA should 
yield asymmetrical outcomes for stakeholders. Indeed, the foregoing 
statement in Indalex seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier 
statements in Century Services. In particular, the Supreme Court stated in 
Century Services that: (1) the BIA and CCAA form “part of an integrated 
body of insolvency law”; and (2) although the BIA and CCAA contain 
different reorganization procedures because “reorganizations of differing 
complexity require different legal mechanisms…only one statutory 
scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor’s 
estate.”27 More recently, the Quebec Superior Court’s decision in Bloom 
Lake pointed out the “strange asymmetry”28 that would result if the BIA 
scheme of distribution were not applied in liquidating CCAA proceedings:
There is no statutory scheme of distribution under the CCAA because 
the CCAA is not intended to be the vehicle for a liquidation of assets and 
distribution of the proceeds. The CCAA is intended as a vehicle for the 
restructuring of the debtor… 
The bottom line is that a liquidating CCAA requires a scheme of 
distribution and the only one which makes sense is the scheme of 
distribution under the BIA. As a result, and unless there is a contradiction 
between the CCAA and the BIA, the BIA scheme of distribution should 
apply in a liquidating CCAA.29
25. See BIA, supra note 7 s 136.
26. Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v United Steelworkers, 2013 SCC 6 [Indalex].
27. Century Services, supra note 11 at para 78.
28. Bloom Lake, supra note 18 at para 205, citing Century Services, supra note 11 at para 47.
29. Bloom Lake, supra note 18 at paras 203-208.
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Thus far, these apparently inconsistent approaches to the question of 
which distribution scheme ought to apply in liquidating CCAAs remain 
unresolved.30
Thirdly, and more generally, important protections available to 
stakeholders in full CCAA proceedings may be absent in liquidating 
CCAAs. A traditional CCAA process may involve dozens of court 
appearances over the course of several months or even years. At each 
stage, the supervising judge must review the debtor’s progress towards 
developing a viable plan of arrangement that treats all stakeholders fairly. 
In a liquidation, the goal is to complete the sale as quickly as possible. In 
contrast to full CCAA proceedings, many of the negotiations leading to the 
proposed sale may well have occurred prior to the debtor’s CCAA ? ling 
and without the court’s supervision. Those negotiations would include the 
senior secured creditors and perhaps a few other key stakeholders, but 
would necessarily exclude most of the junior and unsecured creditors, as 
well as many other stakeholders. In short, the structure and procedures of 
the CCAA are poorly suited to sales and the likely losers in quick sales 
are those stakeholders who possess the least amount of leverage vis-à-vis 
the debtor and senior creditors.31 While Parliament could certainly address 
these de? ciencies in the structure and procedures of the CCAA to account 
for liquidating CCAAs, doing so would require a comprehensive approach 
to amending the Act for which Parliament appears to have no appetite.32
In light of the foregoing issues, it is prudent to ask whether the CCAA 
is truly the most appropriate mechanism for liquidating CCAAs, and if not, 
what can be done to remedy the situation. The answers to these questions 
depend, at least in part, upon how liquidating CCAAs are affecting 
different types of stakeholders in practice compared with traditional CCAA 
proceedings. Yet, as discussed below, the available data on the outcomes 
of CCAA proceedings remain scarce.
30. For further discussion, see Alfonso Nocilla & Vern DaRe, “The Trouble with Pre-Packs,” in 
Janis P Sarra et al, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2018 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019) 
621.
31. Wood, supra note 17 at 412-415.
32. Historically, such comprehensive attempts at reforming the insolvency regime have been non-
starters in Ottawa. Arguably, the last major attempts at comprehensive reforms occurred in the 1980s, 
and all of them ended in failure. Consequently, since that time, successive governments have favoured 
a piecemeal approach to insolvency law reform. See Jacob S Ziegel, “The Travails of Bill C-12” 
(1983) 8:3 Can Bus LJ 374; Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996), 
70:4 Am Bankr LJ 383; Alfonso Nocilla, “The History of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 
and the Future of Restructuring Law in Canada” (2014) 56:1 Can Bus LJ 73.
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II. Quantitative outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA proceedings
1. Methodology
The OSB maintains an online public record of all CCAA proceedings initiated 
since 18 September 2009.33 A review of the OSB’s online CCAA records 
list identi? ed 77 separate ? lings between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 
2013. These dates were selected for several reasons. Firstly, cases begun in 
2012 and 2013 were almost all likely to have been completed by the time 
of this study, permitting collection of all available data on costs, returns 
to creditors and duration of proceedings. Secondly, although examining 
cases over several years would have been preferable to focusing on only 
two years, there were practical limitations to conducting a longer multi-
year study. Although 77 CCAA proceedings may seem like a low number, 
many proceedings involved joint ? lings by complex corporate groups. In 
addition, as noted earlier, average asset values were signi? cantly higher 
in CCAA proceedings than in other types of insolvency proceedings, such 
as BIA commercial proposals. CCAA ? lings are accordingly complex, and 
the 77 proceedings examined from 2012 and 2013 included hundreds of 
monitors’ reports, court orders and motion materials, all of which were 
reviewed individually in order to manually record the relevant data.34
Document review, manual data extraction and verifying database entries 
consumed over 230 hours of research time, or roughly 3 hours per CCAA 
proceeding, although actual times per case varied signi? cantly because 
some cases were longer and more complex than others.
A database of CCAA proceedings was created in Excel based on the 
OSB’s records. Electronic versions of records of each proceeding were 
33. Of? ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “CCAA Records List,” online: <www.
ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br02281.html> [perma.cc/AB8B-HW6J]. The OSB is required to 
collect and maintain this public record pursuant to s 26(1) of the CCAA, which came into force on 18 
September 2009.
34. The monitor is an accountant and licensed trustee in bankruptcy appointed at the time of the initial 
CCAA order pursuant to section 11.7 of the Act. Although originally a judicial creation, Parliament has 
codi? ed the role and duties of the monitor in the CCAA. As an of? cer of the court, the monitor is tasked 
with various duties under section 23 of the CCAA, including especially the duties to report to the court 
on the debtor’s business and affairs, investigate the causes of the debtor’s insolvency, and generally to 
assist the debtor in its restructuring and advise the court as to the reasonableness and fairness of any 
proposed arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. The monitor owes a ? duciary duty to the 
stakeholders of the insolvent debtor, must act independently, and must treat all parties in the CCAA 
proceedings reasonably and fairly. See Winalta Inc (Re), 2011 ABQB 399 at paras 67-77 [Re Winalta].
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then gathered from the websites of the monitors appointed in each case.35
These records included court orders, notices to creditors, and monitors’ 
reports detailing the progress of each case. The following data were 
manually collected and entered into the database, where available:
a. ID Number: Each case was assigned a unique identi? cation 
number. Corporate group ? lings were treated as a single case/
? ling because the restructurings of different entities within the 
same corporate groups were conducted through collective CCAA 
proceedings in each case.
b. Name of company: The name(s) of the entity or entities identi? ed 
in the monitor’s reports.
c. Commencement Date: Date on which CCAA proceedings were 
initiated, based on the court order granting CCAA protection.
d. End Date: Date on which the CCAA proceedings terminated, 
based on the court order terminating proceedings. For the 10 cases 
that remained ongoing at the time that this article was written, 
the current date (9 May 2019) was used in order to calculate 
duration.36 
e. Incorporation Date: Date on which the debtor (for corporate 
groups, the parent company) was incorporated, as reported by the 
monitor.
f. Industry Sector: Business sector of the debtor, if recorded by the 
monitor.
g. Type of Proceeding: Each case was classi? ed based upon a review 
of the monitor’s reports. Cases were classi? ed as either traditional 
restructurings or liquidating CCAAs. Liquidating CCAAs were 
further divided into going-concern sales and piecemeal sales.
h. Secured Debt: Total amount of secured debt at the time of ? ling.
i. Preferred Debt: Total amount of preferred debt at the time of 
? ling.
35. Among its other duties, the monitor in each CCAA proceeding must make its reports and various 
other materials, including court orders and motion materials, publicly available on its website. The 
OSB’s online CCAA records list includes links to the monitor’s website in each proceeding. However, 
as discussed later, monitors’ websites are typically taken down after a period of time has elapsed 
following the conclusion of the CCAA process, and accordingly, the relevant documents from each 
proceeding are not always readily available.
36. In statistical terms, the durations of the ongoing cases are censored data—they are unknown. 
Various statistical methods may need to be applied in order to account for these data and avoid 
bias. However, the numbers of cases in the present study are likely too small to model censored 
observations. See generally Rizwaan Mokal, Nigel J Balmer & Alfonso Nocilla, “United Kingdom 
National Findings” (14 May 2018) at 55, online (pdf): Contractualised Distress Resolution in the 
Shadow of the Law <www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/National-Findings-UK-formatted-
clean.pdf > [perma.cc/EZV8-YQEV].
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j. Unsecured Debt: Total amount of unsecured debt at the time of 
? ling.
k. Secured Returns: Total returns to secured creditors upon 
termination of proceedings.
l. Preferred Returns: Total returns to preferred creditors upon 
termination.
m. Unsecured Returns: Total returns to unsecured creditors upon 
termination.
n. Total Costs: Total costs incurred by the debtor in the CCAA 
process, including monitor’s fees and legal and other professional 
expenses.
o. Name of Monitor and Law Firm: The names of the accounting 
? rm and individual appointed as the debtor’s monitor, as well as 
the monitor’s legal counsel.
p. Province: The province in which proceedings were initiated.
2. Challenges with data collection and cautionary notes
Manual data collection and entry was a time-consuming process. 
For several reasons, it was often dif? cult to collect the relevant data. 
Firstly, successive monitors’ reports in each case rarely summarized the 
information contained in previous reports. Consequently, each successive 
report had to be reviewed in order to identify and manually enter the data. 
Secondly, many records were inconsistent both in terms of the data that 
they presented and the manner in which they presented it—despite their 
general similarities in formatting, monitors’ reports were rarely uniform 
across different cases. Thirdly, although monitors are required to maintain 
all relevant reports on their websites while the CCAA proceedings are 
ongoing, many monitors’ websites become inactive shortly after the 
proceedings have concluded. Accordingly, the relevant records could 
only be obtained by requesting them from individual accounting ? rms. 
Moreover, records of cases that had concluded several years ago and for 
which the monitors’ website had become inactive were often incomplete.
Lastly, it should be noted that there are limits to what can be extrapolated 
from examining the data from only two years of CCAA proceedings. In 
particular, business cycles in different industries can strongly in? uence 
insolvency ? lings each year. Even during broad economic downturns, it is 
common for insolvency cases to be concentrated in only certain industry 
sectors. Consequently, the average size of debtors, types of assets and 
duration of proceedings, among things, may vary signi? cantly depending 
on the time period under examination. For example, CCAA cases in 
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the early 1990s were dominated by the commercial real estate crash;37
the early 2000s, meanwhile, saw the failures of major technology and 
telecommunications ? rms such as Nortel38 and Canwest.39 Examining 
only certain years in isolation may, therefore, may result in bias and limit 
the potential to generalize ? ndings.40 Nonetheless, as discussed below, the 
data presented here offer several useful insights. 
3. Results
i. Procedures by type, year and province
Of the 33 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2013, 22 were liquidating CCAAs 
(67 per cent), 9 were traditional reorganizations (27 per cent), and 2 
were terminated shortly after commencement and entered bankruptcy or 
receivership (6 per cent). Of the 44 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2012, 
28 were liquidating CCAAs (64 per cent), 7 were reorganizations (16 per 
cent), and 9 failed and entered bankruptcy or receivership (20 per cent). 
Ontario had the most total ? lings (30) as well as the most liquidating CCAAs 
(22) over both years, followed by Alberta (18 and 10, respectively), British 
Columbia (13 and 9, respectively), and Quebec (10 and 5, respectively). 
Total proceedings by type, province and year of ? ling are shown below in 
Table 1.
Table 1.  CCAA Filings By Type, Province and Year: 
1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013
Province Type of Filing 2013 2012 Total Both Years
ALTA.
Sale 3 7 10
Bkptcy/Rec’p 1 4 5
Reorganization 2 1 3
B.C.
Sale 4 5 9
Bkptcy/Rec’p 0 0 0
Reorganization 2 2 4
37. Olympia & York, for instance, was one of the largest commercial real estate developers in the 
world when it ? led for CCAA protection in 1992. See Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd, [1993] 
OJ No 545, 12 OR (3d) 500 (Ont Gen Div) [Olympia].
38. Re Nortel Networks Corporation, (2009) 50 CBR (5th) 77 (ONSC).
39. Ibid; Olympia, supra note 37; Re Canwest, supra note 2.
40. Restructuring is a cyclical business and periods of high activity are often, if not always, sparked 
by major downturns in speci? c industries. For example, given the signi? cant differences in the assets 
and operations of companies in the forestry industry compared with those in real estate or technology, 
examining only certain years of CCAA proceedings could skew the data towards companies with 
speci? c characteristics. A much longer longitudinal study would be preferable for this reason alone, 
but it would require a signi? cantly greater investment in time and resources than any quantitative 
studies of CCAA cases to date.
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???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
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N.B.
???? ? ? ?
???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
N.S.
???? ? ? ?
???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
ON.
???? ?? ?? ??
???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
P.E.I.
???? ? ? ?
???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
QUE.
???? ? ? ?
???????????? ? ? ?
?????????????? ? ? ?
TOTAL
???? 22 28 50
???????????? 2 7 9
?????????????? 9 9 18
???? Duration of proceedings
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iv. Returns by type of proceeding and class of creditor
Returns were calculated as percentages of the debts owing to each class of 
creditors. For liquidating CCAAs, overall returns to all classes of creditors 
were roughly 35 per cent of debt (based on 37 cases), with average returns 
to secured creditors amounting to roughly 72 per cent (17 cases), compared 
with roughly 41 per cent for unsecured creditors (8 cases). By comparison, 
total returns in reorganizations were roughly 21 per cent of total debt (8 
cases) with roughly 54 per cent for secureds (5 cases) and 56 per cent 
for unsecureds (5 cases). For the bankruptcies/receiverships, average total 
returns were roughly 30 per cent (4 of 9 cases).41
v. Entity size by procedure
Total debt was used as a proxy for entity size, with total debt of the 
corporate group as a whole used for measuring size in group ? lings. 
Average total debt in liquidating CCAAs was $123,981,154, with a 
median of $24,880,044 (for 46 of 50 available cases). By comparison, 
total average debt in reorganizations was $348,752,998.31, with a median 
of $153,253,000 (11 of 17 cases). For bankruptcies/receiverships, average 
total debt was $55,578,414, with a median of $26,171,027.50 (8 of 9 
cases).
4. Comments and analysis
i. CCAA sales are now the norm
The foregoing data disclose that a solid majority of CCAA proceedings 
initiated in 2012 and 2013 were liquidating CCAAs—64 per cent and 67 
per cent, respectively. By comparison, an earlier study by the author found 
that roughly 33 per cent of CCAA proceedings between 2002 and 2012 were 
liquidating CCAAs, while 31 per cent were traditional reorganizations.42 In 
addition, more recently, Janis Sarra reported that 78 per cent of CCAA 
proceedings initiated between 1 January 2014 and 1 November 2016 were 
liquidating CCAAs.43 In short, the trend towards using the CCAA as a 
mechanism for selling substantially all of the assets of insolvent debtors 
appears to be accelerating, such that CCAA sales are now the dominant 
form of proceeding. The data also disclose that while liquidating CCAAs 
41. The data on returns to different classes of creditors in bankruptcies/receiverships were too scarce 
to calculate average returns by class.
42. See Nocilla, supra note 18 at 388-389. It should be noted that this earlier study only examined 
reported decisions, whereas the present study gathered the available data on all proceedings initiated 
in 2012 and 2013.
43. Janis Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium 
for Insolvency Law” in Janis P Sarra & Honourable Barbara Romaine, eds, Annual Review of 
Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 9.
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are still most common in Ontario, they are now routinely carried out in 
provinces where courts had been reluctant to approve them in past, such 
as Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec.
ii. CCAA Sales took longer than reorganizations
Interestingly, corporations that sold all or substantially all of their assets 
spent more time in CCAA protection than companies that reorganized – an 
average of 36 months with a median of 28, compared with an average of 
33 months and a median of 23, respectively. Speed is often touted as one of 
the supposed bene? ts of liquidating CCAAs, but these results suggest that 
liquidating CCAAs are, in fact, signi? cantly lengthier procedures than full 
reorganizations. This ? nding, however, should be quali? ed by noting that 
the duration of CCAA proceedings does not necessarily re? ect the time and 
resources spent on the sale process itself—for example, it is possible that 
many companies simply remained under CCAA protection for extended 
periods of time after selling off their assets, with minimal work done by 
the monitor and legal counsel after the sale was completed. The reason for 
remaining in CCAA protection in many of these cases may simply have 
been to facilitate the distribution of the sale proceeds to the creditors.44
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that CCAA sales do not appear to be 
faster than traditional reorganizations.
iii. Total costs were roughly comparable in CCAA sales and 
reorganizations
Another supposed bene? t of CCAA sales is that they are more cost-
effective than full reorganizations, partly because they can be completed 
more quickly than reorganizations. Again, this assertion does not appear 
to be supported in the data collected here. In fact, it appears that overall 
costs, as a percentage of the returns generated by each procedure, 
were roughly comparable in each type of proceeding—13 per cent for 
liquidating CCAAs compared with 14 per cent for reorganizations. Of 
course, this study only measured the direct costs of proceedings in the 
form of monitors’ fees, legal fees and other restructuring expenses. There 
may well have been signi? cant indirect costs incurred by corporations 
that underwent traditional reorganizations, such as the loss of goodwill 
44. This area is ripe for further investigation in future quantitative studies of CCAA proceedings. 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the costs, durations and total returns of liquidating 
CCAAs, it would be necessary to review all of the relevant records from any concurrent or subsequent 
receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. Where less than all of the debtor’s assets were sold in the 
CCAA proceedings, the remaining assets would be liquidated through bankruptcy or receivership, and 
the sale proceeds might then be distributed to the creditors through one of those processes rather than 
through the CCAA proceedings.
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and damage to relationships with suppliers and customers, that were not 
borne by corporations which conducted quick sales of their assets; such 
indirect costs were not tracked in this study. To the extent that a sale can 
quickly transfer the debtor’s underlying business on a going concern basis 
to a new solvent entity, untarnished by the insolvent debtor’s troubles 
and with different management, then the business would not suffer the 
foregoing indirect costs. Accordingly, there may be additional cost savings 
in liquidating CCAAs that could not be tracked in this study. Nonetheless, 
these are interesting results, as we might still have expected to see lower 
direct costs for liquidating CCAAs because a quick sale would typically 
truncate the expensive CCAA process and reduce the number of court 
appearances required, thereby reducing direct costs signi? cantly compared 
with a traditional reorganization. It seems unlikely that these results can 
be explained by the longer duration of CCAA sales proceedings that was 
noted above; rather, a more likely explanation may be that CCAA sales 
are “front-loaded” in the sense that most of the work by the monitors 
and legal counsel is being done at the outset of the process. Another 
explanation may be found in the fact that, as discussed below, typical 
candidates for liquidating CCAAs tended to be smaller companies than 
those that reorganized. In short, the CCAA remains an expensive process, 
and some costs are essentially ? xed, such that smaller businesses are likely 
to incur higher costs as a proportion of the overall value of their assets and, 
therefore, of the returns to their creditors following a sale, compared with 
larger businesses. At all events, these data suggest that while CCAA sales 
might well be completed more quickly than traditional reorganizations, 
there are no signi? cant savings in CCAA sales in terms of direct costs.
iv. Overall returns were higher in CCAA sales, but unsecured creditors 
were worse off
As noted earlier, overall average returns in liquidating? CCAAs were 
signi? cantly higher than in reorganizations—35 per cent compared with 
21 per cent. However, this overall number masked signi? cant differences 
in terms of how different classes of creditors fared under each procedure. 
Speci? cally, in liquidating CCAAs, secured creditors enjoyed average 
returns of 72 per cent of debt, while unsecureds averaged 41 per cent. 
By comparison, average returns in reorganizations were 54 per cent 
for secureds and 56 per cent for unsecureds. Although care should be 
taken in interpreting these results due to the low numbers of cases for 
which the relevant data were available, these results suggest that any 
bene? ts obtained in liquidating CCAAs ? owed to secured creditors, 
whereas unsecureds were worse off compared with how they fared in 
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reorganizations. Moreover, since a debtor that successfully reorganized 
would exit the CCAA process and continue to operate, it might reasonably 
be expected that the long-term prospects for unsecured creditors, and 
especially equity holders, would be much better in reorganizations than in 
liquidating CCAAs. Accordingly, although total overall returns appeared 
to be signi? cantly higher in liquidating CCAAs, there are some important 
caveats to that ? nding. Based on the admittedly limited data here, it would 
seem that secured creditors fared far better in liquidating CCAAs than in 
reorganizations, and to some extent this came at the expense of unsecured 
creditors.
III. Implications and reform recommendations 
1. Comparisons to pre-packs in the U.K. and 363 sales in the U.S.
There is an ongoing debate as to whether quick sales under section 363 
of chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code45 (363 Sales) and pre-packs 
under the Insolvency Act 1986 in the U.K.,46 both of which are functionally 
equivalent to liquidating CCAAs in many ways, generate better returns for 
creditors than traditional reorganizations. 
Although the available data in the present study were comparatively 
limited, the results here disclose some broad similarities in the outcomes 
of liquidating CCAAs in Canada, pre-packs in the U.K., and 363 sales in 
the U.S. As with pre-packs and 363 sales, liquidating CCAAs have clearly 
grown in popularity. At the same time, the average total costs of liquidating 
CCAAs were roughly comparable to those of traditional reorganizations. By 
comparison, the costs of pre-packs in the U.K. were only modestly lower 
than those of standard administrations, averaging 69.6 per cent of total 
realizations, compared with 72.2 per cent for standard administrations.47
While overall returns to creditors appeared to be higher in liquidating CCAAs 
than in traditional reorganizations, unsecured creditors ended up worse 
off in liquidating CCAAs. Likewise, pre-packs yielded particularly poor 
returns for preferred and unsecured creditors and marginally lower overall 
45. 11 USC §§ 101 et seq.
46. See Alfonso Nocilla, “Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison 
of the UK, US and Canadian Models” (2017) 26:1 J Int Insol Rev 60. In a standard administration 
under the Insolvency Act 1986, the insolvent debtor or the court appoints an insolvency professional 
known as an administrator to manage the debtor’s affairs and operations. Interim moratoria are 
then imposed on enforcement actions against the debtor while the administrator attempts to rescue 
the debtor or its business. By contrast, in a pre-pack, the debtor’s senior managers negotiate a sale 
of the debtor’s underlying business prior to appointing the administrator. Upon appointment, the 
administrator quickly implements the pre-arranged deal and completes the sale.
47. Mokal, supra note 36 at 72, Figure 38.
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returns compared with standard administrations,48 while 363 sales yielded 
lower prices than Chapter 11 plan sales, even correcting for the ? nancial 
health of the debtor companies examined.49 Lastly, pre-packs were only 
marginally faster than going concern sale administrations, having median 
durations of 11.8 months compared with 12 months, respectively,50 while 
liquidating CCAAs actually took longer than traditional reorganizations, 
with median durations of 28 and 23 months, respectively. The relative 
speed of each procedure was the only signi? cant difference in the results 
for liquidating CCAAs and pre-packs, on the one hand, and 363 sales, on 
the other: it is clear that 363 sales are signi? cantly faster than full Chapter 
11 plan sales, as the latter require far more steps to be completed, such as 
the development of a formal plan and a creditor vote, before the sale can 
be completed. Consequently, a Chapter 11 plan sale could take at least 3 
months to complete, compared with mean and median durations of 82 and 
74 days, respectively, for 363 sales.51
In short, the typical justi? cations of both liquidating CCAAs and 
pre-packs—namely, that they are faster, more cost-effective and more 
likely to yield higher returns than traditional reorganization procedures 
—were not supported by the data gathered in either Canada or the U.K. 
This conclusion is particularly interesting given that the average sizes of 
debtor companies differed signi? cantly between Canada and the U.K. In 
general, pre-packs in the U.K. are a SME phenomenon, while most CCAA 
proceedings involve large corporations. At the same time, although 363 
sales in the U.S. are clearly faster than Chapter 11 plan sales, 363 sales—
like pre-packs and liquidating CCAAs—tend to leave unsecured creditors 
worse off than full Chapter 11 plans. The primary cause of lower prices 
in 363 sales seems to be that the process bypasses the typical protections 
that preferred and unsecured creditors possess in full Chapter 11 plan 
proceedings.52 This is a common theme in 363 sales in the U.S., pre-packs 
in the U.K., and liquidating CCAAs in Canada. As Sarra notes, the shift 
48. Ibid at 111.
49. Anne M Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, “Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales 
and the Existence of Fire Sales” (2014) 22:1 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 1 at 17.?In a full Chapter 11 plan 
con? rmation process, the creditors have an opportunity to negotiate and vote upon the terms of the 
proposed sale. By contrast, in a 363 sale, the terms of the sale or of the sale process are usually set by 
the debtor prior to ? ling for Chapter 11 protection, and no creditor vote occurs.
50. Mokal, supra note 36 at 13-14, Figure 4.
51. Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, “Final Report and Recommendations” (2014) at 
84-86, online (pdf): American Bankruptcy Institute <abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h> 
[perma.cc/C7YR-AKE4]. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J Lubben, “Sales or Plans: A 
Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 591 at 627 
(commenting on the greater speed of 363 sales compared with liquidating CCAAs).
52. Anderson, supra note 49.
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towards sales can be explained, at least in part, by changes in debt markets 
that have strengthened the position of secured creditors at the expense of 
weaker stakeholders:
In Canada, a result of changes to debt markets has been that the CCAA has 
become largely a senior creditors’ statute, with increasing liquidations 
driven not by the local creditors of early bankruptcy legislation, but 
often by foreign creditors, resulting, in some instances, in diminution of 
economic activity and exit of assets. Rather than a race to assets by horse 
and buggy, the rapidity of distressed debt trading and the rush to litigation 
or threat of litigation is now pushing the pendulum back to a new kind of 
race to the assets. Many policies that facilitated trade and the movement 
of capital across borders, policies that underpinned Canada’s economic 
growth, set the stage for what is occurring now. Courts are confronted 
with fait accompli applications before them, in effect bypassing many 
of the checks and balances of the system. Sales under these conditions 
often do not have the protections built into a CCAA plan that prevent 
misconduct.53
A variety of other factors help to explain the shift towards sales. 
Firstly, Canada—like the U.S. and U.K.—has clearly shifted from a 
manufacturing-based to a services-based economy over the past three 
decades.54 In general, the shift towards a services-based economy means 
that more businesses are comprised of intangible assets and highly fungible 
hard assets than in the past, making going concern sales an increasingly 
viable alternative to full-scale reorganizations.55 Secondly, as alluded to 
above, globalisation and changes in lending practices have signi? cantly 
altered the restructuring playing ? eld in Canada, with securitization 
and collateralization having “profoundly altered the nature of debt.”56
53. Sarra, supra note 43 at 23-24.
54. Businesses in the services industry now comprise roughly 70% of Canadian GDP and employ 
93% of the nation’s workforce, compared with 80% of GDP and 95% of employment in the UK 
and 78% of GDP and 86% of employment in the U.S. See “Value Added by Activity” (accessed 26 
August 2019), online: OECD Data <data.oecd.org/natincome/value-added-by-activity.htm> [perma.
cc/T4UJ-DQK6]; See also Statistics Canada, “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Basic Prices, 
By Industry, Annual Average” (accessed 26 August 2019), online Statistics Canada <www150.
statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tvaction?pid=3610043403> [perma.cc/XL2N-YGGM] and “Five Facts 
About…The UK Service Sector,” online: Of? ce for National Statistics <www.ons.govuk/economy/
economicoutputandproductivity/output/articles/fivefactsabouttheukservicesector/2016-09-29> 
[perma.cc/2QQT-QGWG]; see also Jassmine Girgis, “The Evolution of Corporate Rescue in Canada 
and the United States” in Jennifer LL Gant & Paul J Omar, eds, Research Handbook on Corporate 
Restructuring (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) [forthcoming].
55. That said, the fact that a company is comprised largely of intangible assets and highly fungible 
hard assets does not necessarily entail a loss of going concern value: see Harvey R Miller & Shai Y 
Waisman, “Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the 
Twenty-First Century?” (2004) 78:2 Am Bankr LJ 153 at 192.
56. Sarra, supra note 43 at 22.
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Whereas lenders traditionally had an interest in the preservation of the 
distressed debtor and its business, and were therefore more likely to 
support reorganization efforts, many lenders today only “want one thing: 
to get paid.”57 For lenders who are primarily interested in a quick return, 
quick sales processes such as liquidating CCAAs, 363 sales and pre-
packs are attractive alternatives to full reorganizations. At the same time, 
securitization and collateralization have contributed to the fragmenting 
of many debtors’ ? nancing structures, making negotiated workouts more 
complex and challenging than in the past. Baird and Rasmussen have 
suggested, for example, that it may be impossible to formulate viable 
reorganization plans for some businesses because there is simply no 
common ground among the different stakeholders. In other words, there 
is an “empty core.”58 Quick sales, driven by the incumbent managers of 
distressed debtors and supported by the senior secured creditors, may be 
one solution to such deadlocks. Forcing a quick sale minimizes the time 
spent negotiating with disparate stakeholder groups and provides certainty 
as to the outcome of the insolvency process if negotiations fail, effectively 
“putting a gun to the parties’ heads.”59
Meanwhile, debtor-in-possession (DIP) ? nancing practices have 
signi? cantly strengthened the position of pre-existing secured creditors, 
effectively giving them a “stranglehold over debtors” by permitting them 
to obtain priority over all of a distressed debtor’s assets in exchange for 
agreeing to ? nance the restructuring.60 Once a DIP lender is in control, it 
can impose various positive and negative covenants on a distressed debtor, 
limiting the debtor’s cash ? ow and establishing a strict timeframe for the 
restructuring.61 The DIP lender may also insist that the debtor retain the 
lender’s preferred monitor,62 change the composition of the debtor’s board 
of directors, or alter the compensation and terms of employment of the 
57. Jonathan C Lipson, “Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in Bankruptcy” 
(2016) 6:2 Harv Bus L Rev 239 at 289.
58. Douglas G Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, “Antibankruptcy” (2010) 119 Yale LJ 648 at 687-694: 
“An “empty core” exists when three or more parties cannot reach a stable agreement with each other 
because some other agreement always exists that at least one party prefers. In other words, at least one 
person will always defect from any tentative agreement that might be made and, hence, none ever is 
reached.” (ibid at 690 n 190).
59. Ibid 697.
60. Bish, supra note 20.
61. Wood, supra note 17 at 409-410.
62. Re Winalta, supra note 34 at para 11.
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debtor’s senior managers through key employee retention plans (KERPs).63
To be clear, there may be legitimate reasons for implementing KERPs. 
In particular, KERPs can reduce a distressed debtor’s risk of losing key 
employees to competitors during the restructuring process, which may be 
helpful in the “chaotic” early stages of restructuring.64 However, it is clear 
that KERPs may also be used to align the interests of a debtor’s senior 
managers with those of the secured creditors. Powerful managers may be 
able to negotiate substantial bonuses for themselves on the basis that their 
continued employment is essential to the debtor, while the senior lenders 
may be willing to support management knowing full well that ultimately, 
the costs of the KERP will be borne primarily by the debtor’s unsecured 
creditors.65 Notably, in deciding whether or not to approve a KERP, the 
court will typically rely heavily upon the monitor’s opinion as to the 
appropriateness of the KERP.66 Again, this points up the level of in? uence 
that the senior secured creditors and incumbent managers of distressed 
debtors will be able to exercise in some cases. Particularly where the 
debtor is also pursuing a quick sale, thereby limiting the ability of most 
stakeholders to participate in the process, the court may have little else 
on which to base its decision than the monitor’s opinion. In such cases, 
careful scrutiny of the terms of the deal may be lacking when it is needed 
most.67
63. See Wood, supra note 17 at 410, identifying the Crystallex restructuring as a prominent example: 
Crystallex (Re), 2012 ONCA 404 at para 24, add’l reasons 2012 ONCA 527, leave to appeal to SCC 
refused, 2012 CarswellOnt 11931 (SCC). The tactics of Canadian DIP lenders in these regards mirror 
those of DIP lenders in the US: see Douglas G Baird, “The New Face of Chapter 11” (2004) 12:1 Am 
Bankr Inst L Rev 69 at 81 and George W Kuney, “Hijacking Chapter 11” (2004) 21:1 Emory Bankr 
Dev J 19 at 89.
64. Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc (Re), 2018 ONSC 6980. It is now well established that CCAA courts 
can approve KERPs using their general power under section 11 of the Act to make any order that the 
court “considers appropriate in the circumstances” (ibid at para 24) [Re Aralez]; See also Cinram 
International Inc (Re), 2012 ONSC 3767; Grant Forest Products Inc (Re), 2009 CanLII 42046, 57 
CBR (5th) 128 (ON SC).
65. Wood, supra note 17 at 410. It is also worth noting that the value in retaining the same managers 
who may have been complicit in the debtor’s insolvency may be dubious, at best.
66. Re Aralez, supra note 64 at paras 26-28.
67. In extreme cases, courts have gone so far as to replace the monitor because its ability to advise the 
court impartially came into question. See Nelson Education Limited (Re), 2015 ONSC 3580: “There is 
no suggestion that A&M are not professional or not aware of their responsibilities to act independently 
in the role of a monitor. A&M is frequently involved in CCAA matters and is understandably proud of 
its high standard of professionalism. However, that is not the issue. In my view, A&M should not be 
put in the position of being required to step back and give advice to the Court on the essential issue 
before the Court in light of its central role in the whole process that will be considered” (ibid at para 
31).
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2. Reform recommendations
Although the data set out in this article shed important light on liquidating 
CCAAs, further study is needed in order to con? rm whether the results 
discussed here are statistically signi? cant and broadly representative. 
In particular, although pre-packaged sales under the CCAA are only 
just emerging now, it seems likely that they will ultimately become the 
dominant form of liquidating CCAA in the future. Accordingly, future 
quantitative studies should examine the outcomes of CCAA pre-packs once 
a suf? cient number of these cases have been completed, so as to provide 
a fuller picture of how the CCAA regime is operating. Having said this, 
several reform recommendations can be made based upon these results 
and the broader theoretical concerns with liquidating CCAAs raised here.
Firstly, the OSB should establish an online repository for CCAA 
records similar to the one maintained by Companies House in the U.K.68
Although the OSB’s website currently provides basic information on 
CCAA proceedings such as the dates of initiation of proceedings and the 
names of the monitors, there is no central repository for records, nor are 
the monitors’ websites, which contain the records, maintained after the 
proceedings have concluded. As a result, it is often challenging to obtain 
full records of CCAA cases after they have concluded, complicating 
attempts to discern what is occurring in CCAA cases and to determine 
whether changes are needed.
Secondly, along the same lines, the OSB should establish clearer 
standards for monitors in reporting the outcomes of CCAA proceedings. 
In a typical CCAA proceeding, the monitor may issue a dozen reports 
or more, such that gathering useful data involves reviewing hundreds 
of pages of materials. In short, regular, comprehensive data collection 
for the purposes of informing policymakers would be prohibitively 
expensive in terms of the time and resources required. A simple solution 
to facilitate data collection would be to require the monitor to include, 
in its ? nal report, a summary of all of the actions taken over the course 
of the CCAA proceedings and the key results of the proceedings. To the 
extent that this approach might raise privacy and con? dentiality issues, 
the OSB could maintain the con? dentiality of the monitor’s reports, or the 
relevant portions thereof, and merely report on the anonymized aggregate 
data. Alternatively, the OSB could provide access to the relevant reports 
or redacted portions thereof to researchers who would be bound by 
68. Companies House is the UK’s registrar of companies. Its online database of company records 
includes, among other things, all documents ? led in formal insolvency proceedings: “Companies 
House,” online: <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/> [perma.cc/N2HJ-4QHB].
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con? dentiality and non-disclosure obligations. In either case, the OSB 
would have a single, central repository with easily accessible information 
on the outcomes of all CCAA proceedings, signi? cantly reducing the 
costs and complications of data collection. The foregoing database would 
permit larger, more detailed and likely more accurate quantitative studies 
of the outcomes of different types of CCAA proceedings that would aid 
policymakers in understanding how this area of the law is functioning and 
evolving. At the same time, participants in CCAA proceedings will bene? t 
from a better understanding of how the regime typically affects similarly 
situated stakeholders, enhancing the certainty and predictability of the 
regime.
Thirdly, Parliament should consider comprehensively amending the 
CCAA to address the growing trend toward liquidating CCAAs, and more 
recently, pre-packs under the CCAA. Only comprehensive amendments 
to the Act can properly address the issues with CCAA sales because, 
as discussed earlier, the Act in its current form is still geared towards 
traditional reorganisations. For example, the CCAA does not contain any 
priority scheme for distributing the proceeds from liquidating CCAAs. 
Parliament must consider whether to introduce a distinct distribution 
scheme for the CCAA or whether to import the scheme from the BIA—
the latter would be the better approach because, as discussed earlier, a 
strange asymmetry would result from imposing different schemes in 
functionally equivalent processes, whereas Parliament and the courts have 
clearly stated that the goal of recent reform efforts has been to harmonize 
common aspects of the BIA and CCAA.69 In addition, it is unclear which 
test courts should apply when they are asked to approve liquidating 
CCAAs. Typically, courts will apply both section 36 of the Act and the 
Soundair test, suggesting that neither test is determinative.70 Parliament 
should provide needed clarity here by incorporating the relevant factors of 
the Soundair test into section 36, eliminating the need for courts to apply 
two distinct, though very similar, tests. Furthermore, Parliament should 
consider whether further changes are needed to section 36 so as to ensure 
that the basic protections for unsecured creditors and other vulnerable 
stakeholders in full reorganisations remain available in liquidating CCAAs. 
In particular, the condensed timelines of CCAA sales make it especially 
dif? cult for objecting creditors to successfully oppose the planned sales. 
One solution would be to require prior disclosure to the relevant parties of 
the terms of the proposed sale, so that those parties could seek professional 
69. Century Services, supra note 11 at para 24.
70. Soundair, supra note 22.
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advice regarding possible alternatives, as a precondition for seeking court 
approval of the sale. Another option would be for the court to appoint 
an independent accounting ? rm, other than the monitor, to review and 
provide its opinion to the court and all stakeholders on the terms of the 
proposed deal. This would provide the unsecured creditors, in particular, 
with an impartial expert opinion other than that of the monitor.71
Conclusion
The quantitative results set out in this article suggest that much of the 
conventional wisdom about liquidating CCAAs may be mistaken. In 
particular, the data examined thus far do not support assertions that 
liquidating CCAAs are signi? cantly faster and more cost-effective than 
traditional reorganizations. Although more work is needed to gain a full 
picture of what is transpiring in liquidating CCAAs, the results thus far 
are concerning in light of the continued trend towards using the CCAA 
as a mechanism to sell substantially all of the assets of insolvent debtor 
companies, a procedure for which the CCAA was never designed.
As noted earlier, the structure of the CCAA still re? ects its original 
purpose of facilitating compromises between insolvent companies and 
their creditors, i.e., reorganizations. Rather than address the inconsistency 
between current CCAA practice and the history and structure of the Act, 
much of the jurisprudence approving liquidating CCAAs has contributed 
to an “intentional confusing of realization and restructuring.”72 At the 
same time, proponents of liquidating CCAAs have offered no evidence 
that these processes are generating better results for creditors as a whole 
than traditional reorganizations; on the contrary, the results disclosed here 
suggest that secured creditors are bene? tting from liquidating CCAAs while 
unsecureds are worse off compared with reorganizations. Again, while 
more data will need to be gathered, these preliminary results lend weight 
to the concern that liquidating CCAAs may have become “a creditor’s 
tool of choice for realizing on its security” rather than a true restructuring 
mechanism.73 In short, proponents of CCAA sales have “con? ate[d] the 
objects of the Act with the wishes of the principal economic actor,” and the 
71. In the UK, for example, pre-packs can be submitted to the Pre-pack Pool, which reviews 
and opines on the terms of the proposed sale. Since such reviews are voluntary, the Pool has seen 
only limited use, see: “Pre-Pack Pool Annual Review 2017” (May 2018), online (pdf): Pre Pack 
Pool <www.prepackpool.co.uk/uploads/? les/documents/Pre-pack-Pool-Annual-Review-2017.pdf> 
[perma.cc/4E2D-2GJE]. However, it would be open to CCAA courts to order similar reviews of the 
terms of proposed CCAA sales, so as to provide the court and the creditors with a second opinion.
72. Bish, supra note 20 at 223-224.
73. Ibid at 232.
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cost of this may be worse outcomes for other stakeholders.74 As with pre-
packs in the U.K. and 363 sales in the U.S., there is a risk that in at least 
some cases, the incumbent managers and secured creditors of insolvent 
debtors will ? nd ways of controlling the liquidating CCAA process, 
maximizing outcomes for themselves at the expense of the stakeholders as 
a group. As incumbent management may have been complicit in a debtor’s 
insolvency in the ? rst place, and secured creditors already possess various 
other tools for realizing upon the assets of their insolvent debtors, this 
seems a wholly inappropriate use of the CCAA process. Until Parliament 
legislates clearer, more comprehensive rules governing CCAA sales, the 
task of curbing such potential abuses of the regime will fall, as usual, on 
the judiciary.
74. Ibid. For further discussion, see Nocilla & DaRe, supra note 30.
